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The 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), a panel of international experts created to assess the current
scientific knowledge on climate, confirmed its earlier predictions that
the earth's climate system is warming at an unprecedented level' (see
also Fig. 1). The panel's conclusions were derived from growing
scientific evidence of shifts in the climate and its consequent effects
on ecological processes and natural habitat. Some of the effects of
climate change relevant to the issues examined in this article as
stipulated in the IPCC 2007 report, are that climate change is likely to
lead to increased sudden onset disasters, such as floods and storms; to
frequent occurrences of droughts and severe water shortages; and
increased sea-level rise. Although the scientific evidence of the
social consequences of climate change still remain indicative rather
than conclusive, the IPCC report asserts that these changes are likely
to trigger sudden, gradual, internal, regional and international
migration.
After discussing the manner in which climate change may
contribute to human migration and the uncertainties inherent in the
current predictions concerning the social effects of climate change, as
well as the possible adaptive responses of people inhabiting the
affected areas, the article critically analyses firstly, the debate on
'environmental refugees;' secondly, the existing estimates of the
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1. LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (Abdelkader Allah et
al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
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numbers allegedly displaced by climate change; and thirdly, the
debate on whether those displaced by climate change should be
accorded rights and protection similar to those available for persons
who flee due to 'well-founded fear of persecution'-refugees. The
points of departure of the article are firstly, it is impossible to isolate
climate change as a cause of migration as this is to a large extent a
function of mitigation and effectiveness of adaptation. Secondly,
displacements triggered by a combination of climate change and
other factors are likely to be internal and short-term rather than
external and permanent.
Some of the environmental changes that induce populations to
abandon their homes or areas of habitual residence are prompted by
natural and/or man-made disasters. Man-made disasters result from
the introduction of hazardous substances into the natural
environment. When disaster strikes, the physical environment in
question may become temporarily or permanently life-threatening or
hazardous for human habitation thereby prompting people to move.
These people are generally referred to in the literature as 'disaster
victims' not as refugees, even when it is clear that the events that
cause their displacement are beyond their control. 2
Some disasters are sudden whilst others are slow onset. Sudden
onset disasters include floods, forest fires, hurricanes, earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, tornadoes and pest infestations. Examples of
sudden/man-made disasters include the Bhopal chemical spill,3 the
release of dioxin in Seveso 4 (Italy) and the nuclear accident in
2. Gregory Button & Anthony Oliver-Smith, Disaster, Displacement, and
Employment, in CAPITALIZING ON CATASTROPHE: NEOLIBERAL STRATEGIES IN
DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 123, 125 (Nandini Gunewardena & Mark Schuller
eds., 2008).
3. Elizabeth Guillette, The Foul Odor of Capital: The Union Carbide Disaster
in Bhopal, India, in CAPITALIZING ON CATASTROPHE: NEOLIBERAL STRATEGIES IN
DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 173, 173 (Nandini Gunewardena & Mark Schuller
eds., 2008).
4. See Mick Corliss, Dioxin: Seveso Disaster Testament to Effects of Dioxin,
May 6, 1999, http://www.getipm.com/articles/seveso-italy.htm. Corliss notes:
Today, birds chatter in the trees and people take Sunday strolls along the
paths of Bosco delle Querce, or Seveso Oak Forest park. One would not
suspect that beneath the lush green carpet and vegetation lurk the
poisonous remains of a chemical disaster nearly 23 years ago. The origin
of the park, roughly 15 km north of Milan in Italy's Lombardy region, can
be traced back to the afternoon of July 10, 1976. A little after noon that
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Chernobyl. Gradual natural/man-made disasters include
desertification, land degradation, global sea rise induced by global
warming, deforestation and aquifer depletion. 5 Examples of gradual
man-made disasters include long-term exposure to toxic chemicals or
low level radiation as in the case of the Micronesia. Some of the
consequences of disasters are reversible whilst others are not. When
the consequences are irreversible, the site in question becomes unfit
for human habitation, i.e. it loses its productive capability to support
life. Displacement from such sites under the existing technological
know-how is permanent.
Saturday, a valve broke at the Industrie Chimiche Meda Societa Azionaria
chemical plant in Meda, releasing a cloud of chemicals containing dioxin
that wafted an estimated 50 meters into the sky. Carried southeast by the
wind, the toxic cloud enshrouded the municipality of Seveso and other
communities in the area. About 3,000 kg of chemicals were released into
the air, according to some researchers. Among them was 2,4,5
trichlorophenol, used in the manufacture of herbicides, and anywhere from
about 100 grams to 20 kg of dioxin, said Dr. Paolo Mocarelli of the
Hospital of Desio. The accident was not immediately noticed. No one was
at the plant when it happened and ICMESA -- the company responsible --
failed to swiftly address the event. The first sign of health problems, burn-
like skin lesions, appeared on children a few hours after the accident.
Beginning in September of that year, chloracne, a severe skin disorder
usually associated with dioxin, broke out on some of the people most
exposed to the cloud. Authorities began an investigation five days after the
accident, when animals such as rabbits began to die en masse. Nearly two
weeks later, a chemist deduced that the cause was dioxin. And within three
weeks, some 736 people living closest to the plant were evacuated. About
37,000 people are believed to have been exposed to the chemicals,
according to researchers familiar with the case. Approximately 4 percent
of local farm animals died, and those that didn't -- roughly 80,000 animals
-- were killed to prevent contamination from filtering up the food chain.
Id.
5. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 26; see also Michel Boko et al., Africa,
in CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACT, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 433 (Frederick
Semmazzi & Mohamed Senouci eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter9.pdf; Rex
Victor Cruz et al., Asia, in CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACT, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY 471 (Daniel Murdiyarso & Shuzo Nishioka eds., 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl 0.pdf.
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II. DROUGHT AND MIGRATION
There is a general agreement among scholars that environmental
change is a factor that contributes to population displacement, but it
is difficult to determine its role with certainty. 6 This is because, more
often than not, what appears to be the result of drought or climate
change can turn out to be the consequent result of market or political
failure. 7  If we take the example of famine, one of the major
proximate causes of population displacements in many arid and semi-
arid regions of the developing world, appearances notwithstanding,
political factors are more to blame than the environment or the
climate. 8  Wisner et al. argue that famine can take place in the
absence of "a well-defined 'trigger' event in nature at all, but instead
as a result of war or conscious attempts to use food as a weapon
(which may become a device for 'ethnic cleansing')." 9
6. See ASTRI SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION,
MIGRATION AND CONFLICT (1993) [hereinafter SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS],
available at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?1374=pressure-points-
environmental-degradation; Astri Suhrke, Environmental Degradation, and
Population Flows, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 473 (1994); Graeme Hugo, Environmental
Concerns and International Migration, 30 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 105 (1996);
William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages between Environmental Change and
Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
42 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter Benda eds., 2001).
7. GAIM KIBREAB, PEOPLE ON THE EDGE IN THE HORN: DISPLACEMENT, LAND
USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE GEDAREF REGION, SUDAN (1996).
8. STEPHEN DEVEREUX, THEORIES OF FAMINE 22-23, 129-30 (1994); JEAN
DRtZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 68 (1989); see generally
ALEXANDER DE WAAL, FAMINE THAT KILLS: DARFUR, SUDAN, 1984-1985 (1989);
AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES (1981).
9. BEN WISNER ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE'S
VULNERABILITY AND DISASTERS 128 (2003).
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Fig. 1 Temperature deviations AD 1000-19981°
Tompfature deviations AD 1000 10I0
Droughts have historically been some of the causal agents of
human migration and according to some analysts, even to the
collapse of pre-historic and early historic societies.11 However, as
will be seen throughout this article, migration is a multi-causal
phenomenon, and drought is only one of the multiple factors that
prompt people to emigrate in search of alternative sources of incomes
or livelihoods. The corollary is that drought alone does not
necessarily drive people to emigrate. Contrary to public perception,
natural factors are not necessarily the cause of drought. Although
natural factors may be partly responsible for drought, it is important
to guard against naturalising its effects on famine and human
10. Nils P. Gleditsch, Ragnhild Nordds, & Idean Salehyan, Climate Change and
Conflict: the Migration Link: Coping with Crisis 2 (International Peace Academy,
Working Paper Series, 2007), available at
http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/cwc-working-paper-Climate-change.
pdf.
11. Boko et al., supra note 5, at 437.
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migration. This is because droughts' impacts on human settlements,
livelihoods and economic activities are mediated by political,
economic and social factors which determine people's coping
mechanisms in terms of their ability to resist, or withstand the effects
of droughts and other associated hazards. 12 In the arid and semi-arid
regions of the global south, the effects of droughts on livelihoods and
human migration are difficult to isolate from livelihood threats,
dislocations and displacements caused by the combined effects of
conflict and war. 
13
Scholarly opinions on the cause of the massive drought that
afflicted the Sahel region in the 1970s and 1980s were deeply divided
between those who attributed the problem to anthropogenic factors
14
and those who argued that the drought was caused by natural
phenomena reflected in natural climate cycle. 15  The social
consequences of the Sahelian drought were also equally contested.
Some activists, including a few vocal ecologists, envisaged the
draught completely wiping out the basis of livelihoods and forcing
tens of millions of people to flee in search of relief food and
alternative settlement sites. For example, Norman Myers claimed
that in "parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where 80 million people were
considered to be semi-starving due primarily to environmental
factors, seven million people had been obliged to migrate in order to
12. KIBREAB, supra note 7, at 19.
13. Id. at 18-19.
14. See FOUAD N. IBRAHIM, ECOLOGICAL IMBALANCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF
SUDAN WITH REFERENCE TO DESERTIFICATION IN DARFUR (1984); see also JOHN
A. DIXON, DAVID E. JAMES, & PAUL B. SHERMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF DRYLAND
MANAGEMENT 1 (1989); ERIK .P. ECKHOLM, LOSING GROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL
STRESS AND WORLD FOOD PROSPECTS 22 (1976); ALAN GRAINGER, THE
THREATENING DESERT: CONTROLLING DESERTIFICATION 1-2 (1990); Paul
Harrison, Beyond the Blame Game: Population-Environment Links, 17 POPULI 14,
14-16 (1990); R. D. Mann, Time Running Out: The Urgent Need for Tree Planting
in Africa, 20 ECOLOGIST 48, 48-49 (1990); H. F. Lamprey, Report on the Desert
Encroachment Reconnaissance in Northern Sudan, in DESERTIFICATION CONTROL
BULLETIN at 1-7 (United Nations Environment Programme, No. 17, 1988).
15. See EVA ALHCRONA, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND MAN ON LAND
TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL SUDAN: APPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING
(1988); Ulf Helld~n, Desertification: Time for Assessment?, 20 AMBIO 372, 382
(1991); ULF HELLDtN, DROUGHT IMPACT MONITORING: A REMOTE SENSING
STUDY OF DESERTIFICATION IN KORDOFAN, SUDAN (1984); Lennart Olsson,
Integrated Resource Monitoring by Means of Remote Sensing, GIS and Spatial
Modelling in Arid Environments, 5 SOIL USE AND MGMT. 30, 30 (1989).
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obtain relief food." 16 It was further argued by Myers and other like-
minded scholars that these so-called massive population movements
may constitute a threat to the national security of receiving
societies. 17
Although it is imprudent to deny the link between drought and
migration, the generalisation that people inhabiting drought-prone
regions are most vulnerable to famine and to environmentally-
induced large-scale displacement because they lack the capacity to
adapt to such environmental conditions is made with limited
examination of the long-standing coping strategies developed over
time through trial and error. The inhabitants of the Sahelian
countries, have, for example, throughout modem history lived on the
razor's edge of survival, eking out meager existence under adverse
and uncertain conditions. This is because cyclical drought has
always been a characteristic feature of the region. As a result, the
inhabitants have been able to develop intricate natural resource
management systems to cope with such ecological stresses.'
8
Undoubtedly, migration has been increased by the severity and
intensity of drought in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, but the
explanation cannot be sought solely in environmental or population
changes. During the last five decades, the problem of drought in this
region has been compounded by wars, conflicts and lack of political
stability.
For example, in the Hom of Africa, the preponderance of conflicts
and wars have broken down the resilience of the natural environment
and the coping strategies of the inhabitants. This is mainly because
war has created safe and unsafe areas. The safe areas have become
overcrowded and the resources degraded due to over use whilst the
16. Norman Myers, Professor, Green College, Oxford University, Remarks at
the 13th Economic Forum of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe: Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue 1 (May 22, 2005)
(transcript available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/2005/05/14488-en.pdf).
17. Id. at 3.
18. Deborah F. Bryceson & Jodie Fonseca, Risking Death for Survival: Peasant
Responses to Hunger and HIVIAIDS in Malawi, 34 WORLD DEV. 1654, 1656
(2006); Ian Scoones, Stephen Devereux, & Lawrence Haddad, Introduction: New
Directions for African Agriculture, 36 IDS BULL. 1, 1-2 (2005); L.T. Ajibade & 0.
Shokemi, Indigenous Approach to Weather Forecasting in Asa. L.G.A., Kwara
State, Nigeria, 2 INDILINGA: AFR. J. OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYS. 37 (2003).
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unsafe areas have remained underutilised. This has rendered the
previously sustainable land use practices or systems obsolete. As a
result, those faced with imminent risk of subsistence insecurity have
had to emigrate in order to eke out a meager existence. 1 9
The assumption that drought-induced migrations are permanent is
also misconceived. Sally Findley states that until recently it was
thought that drought-induced displacements were permanent and
further observes that recent studies cast doubt on these assumptions. 20
Using a longitudinal study undertaken in 1982 and 1989 in Mali, she
concluded, "the level of migration did not rise during the drought of
1983-1985. However, there was a dramatic increase in the migration
of women and children during the severe 1983-1985 drought...
there was a shift to short-cycle circulation, with 64% of the migrants
adopting circular patterns.' She also refers to a study conducted in
Bamaco which showed that both women and men were circular rather
22than permanent migrants. She distinguishes circular migrants from
other migrants by the duration they stay away from home:
A circular migrant stays away between one and six months
and upon return participates in the economic and social life
of the household. He or she retains an economic and social
role within the original household unit. In contrast,
permanent migrants stay away more than six months, do
not return to participate as regular members in the life of
the household, and do not plan to return. The migrant has
shifted his or her work and residence completely to the new
location.
23
Other studies show that climate per se seldom constitutes a root
cause of migration but functions as an exacerbating factor. 24
19. Gaim Kibreab, Migration, Environment and Refugeehood, in ENVIRONMENT
AND POPULATION CHANGE 115, 116-117 (Basia Zaba & John Clarke eds.,1994)
[hereinafter Kibreab, Refugeehood]; GAIM KIBREAB, supra note 7, at 18-21.
20. Sally Findley, Does Drought Increase Migration? A Study of Migration




23. Id. at 540.
24. See sources cited supra note 6.
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Elizabeth Meze-Hausken, in her study of one of the poorest and
drought and famine stricken areas of Ethiopia-the Tigray-region
concluded, "any speculative scenario of mass migration under
climate change must be rejected for dryland populations whose main
strategies are built on adaptation rather than on resignation."
25
There are, however, other studies to show that the Sahelian drought
not only had catastrophic effects on the inhabitants' livelihoods, but it
also induced thousands of people to migrate in search of food relief.
For example, Hal Sheets' and Roger Morris' study described the
dramatic effects of the Sahelian drought as follows:
The drought struck the Sahel with savage effect. From the
spring of 1968 there were ebbing water supplies, chronic
crop failures, and a recurrent need for emergency food
shipments to a million or more people. The disaster was
visibly etched in the ecology of the region. By 1971, Lake
Chad was reduced to one-third its normal size. The great
Senegal and Niger rivers were shrunken in many places to
shallow streams. Each year the wasteland of the Sahara
moved to shallow streams. Each of the wasteland of the
Sahara moved relentlessly southward across the 2,600-mile
belt. Ten miles here, fifty miles there, the desert consumed
the parched land without vegetation or moisture to hold it
back. The flight of some pastoral people began as early as
1968 as hunger hit various areas of Mali, Niger, and
Senegal. By 1972 the migrations were massive, ending in
the refugee camps, new urban slums, or death. USAID
reports estimated the loss of livestock, the livelihood of
nine out of ten people in the region, at 33 percent at the
lowest in Niger to virtual annihilation in Mali.26
25. Elisabeth Meze-Hausken, Migration Caused by Climate Change: How
Vulnerable are People in Dryland Areas? A Case Study of Northern Ethiopia, 5
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 379, 402 (2000)
(emphasis added); see also Elisabeth Meze-Hausken, Contrasting Climate
Variability and Meteorological Drought with Perceived Drought in Northern
Ethiopia, 27 CLIMATE RES. 19 (2004).
26. Hal Sheets & Roger Morris, Disaster in the Desert, in THE POLITICS OF
NATURAL DISASTER: THE CASE OF THE SAHEL DROUGHT 25, 31-32 (Michael H.
Glatz ed., 1976).
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Although the immediate damaging effects of the drought were
undoubtedly true, the fact that Findley's and PUM's studies
conducted a decade after Sheet and Morris' study showed no such
dramatic effects may show that even in drought-prone areas, such as
the Sahel region, droughts are cyclical climatic events and their
effects are reversible. Consequently, drought-induced displacements
or migrations are in the majority of cases, temporary or circular.
It is, however, important to note that it is not just climate change
that induces circular migration in sub-Saharan Africa. Seasonal
migration has always been a vital coping mechanism and an integral
part of the production systems. This is confirmed by the Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in which it is stated:
The role of migration as an adaptive measure, particularly
as a response to drought and flood, is... well known.
Recent evidence, however, shows that such migration is not
only driven by periods of climate stress but is also driven
by a range of other possible factors. Migration is a
dominant mode of labour (seasonal migration), providing a
critical livelihood sources. The role of remittances derived
from migration provides a key coping mechanism in
drought and non-drought years .... 27
The report further states that in the case of Africa, there are no
detailed studies to show a causal link between climate change and
migration. "A variety of migration patterns could thus emerge, e.g.,
repetitive migrants (as part of ongoing adaptation to climate change)
and short-term shock migrants (responding to a particular climate
event). However, few detailed assessments of such impacts using
climate as a driving factor have been undertaken for Africa."28
In spite of the paucity of data, there was and still is a tendency to
attribute the recurrent problems of famine that afflicted the Sahel
region of West Africa, the Hom of Africa and northeast Brazil solely
27. Boko et al., supra note 5, at 452 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 450 (emphasis added); see also Gertrud Schreider & Beatrice Knerr,
Labour Migration as a Social Security Mechanism for Smallholder Households in
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Cameroon, 28 OXFORD DEV. STUDIES 223
(2000).
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to drought and other events such as floods. However, climate change
has recently surfaced as an additional exacerbating factor in the
explanations of food insecurity, population displacement, conflict at
the source and destination. 29 It is undoubtedly true that drought is
one of the many factors that contribute to food shortages, but not all
crop shortages or failures caused by natural conditions create a
famine situation. 30  As Hugon observes one of the significant
differences between people who flee from persecution and from
environmental change is "environmental migration is often the result
of a complex set of multiple pressures of which an environmental
event is only the proximate cause."
31
Suhrke observed that when perceived from a broader development
perspective, environmental degradation represents a proximate rather
than ultimate cause of migration. She further asserts that
demography and political economy rather than the environment are
more salient causal factors. She further states, "[y]et, these obviously
interact in critical ways with specific environmental variables.
Sometimes the result is stress of a kind that leads to massive
outmigration. But to understand why, it is necessary to focus on the
broader development process." 32 Richmond reiterates the same by
stating, "when environmental degradation leads to migration it is
generally as a proximate cause linked to questions of economic
growth, poverty, population pressure, and political conflict." 33 As
Hugon correctly argues, in most cases, especially in the developing
societies, the deeper underlying causes of migration are not
environmental but are related to political, economic, social and
demographic processes. It is important therefore that policy
interventions address the more fundamental causes of the migration
rather than the triggering event which initiates migration. 
34
29. Boko et al., supra note 5, at 456; Cruz et al., supra note 5, at 471; NICHOLAS
STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REvIEw 97, 111 (2006),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Part IIIntroduction-.group.pdf.
30. SEN, supra note 8; Philippe Hugon, Food Insecurity and Famine in Southern
Africa, and Economic Debate: Lack of Availabilities, Market Failures, Inequalities
of Rights, Effects of Shocks or Systemic Risks? (unpublished paper prepared for
SARPN Meeting: Food Security in Southern Africa, Pretoria, March 18, 2003).
31. Hugon, supra note 30, at 109.
32. SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS, supra note 6, at 7.
33. Hugon, supra note 30, at 117.
34. Id. at 118.
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As noted earlier, in war-torn or conflict-ridden societies, migration
is a complex multi-causal process in which different factors interact
to engender varied responses, including internal migration and, in
few cases, migration across an international border. In the 1980s, the
Horn of Africa was a major refugee producing region. These
displacements were due to interplay between persecution, conflict,
war, drought and environmental degradation. 35 In the 1990s, there
were about 4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Sudan
of which about one million were in the capital Khartoum. Johnathan
Bascom, among others, states:
The vast majority of these people fled to the capital to
escape the brutalities of a protracted civil war in the
southern region of the country, exacerbated further by
drought, a series of famines, the erosion of their
agricultural production systems, and finally, the collapse of
their former way of life.36
From the 1970s onwards, sub-Saharan Africa faced rising numbers
of forced migrants caused by a combination of political instability,
persecution, civil wars, drought, high population densities, poverty,
lack of off-farm income-generating opportunities, climate variability,
land degradation, inequitable resource distribution, inauspicious
property rights regimes in conjunction with corrupt and inefficient
administrations and commercialisation of agricultural production. 37
As a result, some ecologists have argued that most population
displacements occurring in the poor countries in the global south
were environmentally rather than politically-induced.38 Interestingly,
35. KIBREAB, supra note 7, at 18-20.
36. Johnathan Bascom, 'Internal Refugees:' The Case of the Displaced in
Khartoum, in GEOGRAPHY AND REFUGEES: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE
33, 33 (Richard Black & Vaughan Robinson eds., 1993).
37. KIBREAB, supra note 7, at 19; see also GAIM KIBREAB, STATE
INTERVENTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN SUDAN, 1889-1989: THE DEMISE OF
COMMUNAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, at xviii (2002) [hereinafter KIBREAB, STATE
INTERVENTION]; Gaim Kibreab, Property Rights, Development Policy and
Depletion of Resources: The Case of the Central Rainlands of Sudan, 1940s-1980s,
7 ENv'T & HIST. 57 (2001).
38. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS: AN
EMERGENT CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 24-27 (1995); JODI L. JACOBSON,
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the view that environmental degradation rather than persecution lay
at the heart of mass population movement in South Asia and Africa
was shared by the states in the global north, which feared that the
erosion of livelihood systems in such regions would force millions of
starving people into their territories. Most governments used such a
perceived catastrophic scenario to justify their restrictive refugee and
immigration policies. According to this view, the overwhelming
majority of the internally and internationally displaced persons were
to be considered environmental rather than political refugees. 
39
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MIGRATION: THE NEW SURGE
OF INTEREST
The debate on climate change and migration has taken a sharp turn
in the recent past with a resurgence of interest in the debate on
climate change and its social consequences, especially human
migration. Wisner et al. state that climate change "is becoming a
major focus in understanding the possible increase of extreme events,
in which natural hazards are magnified in intensity and frequency.
Yet it is almost certain that the reasons for this climate change are
ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: A YARDSTICK OF HABITABILITY 5, 6 (Worldwatch
Inst., Worldwatch Paper 86, 1988); David S. Lazarus, Environmental Refugees:
New Strangers at the Door, 2 OUR PLANET 12 (1990); Norman Myers,
Environmental Refugees, 19 POP. & ENV'T 167 (1997); Norman Myers,
Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World: Estimating the Scope of
What Could Become a Prominent International Phenomenon, 43 BIOSCIENCE 752
(1993) [hereinafter Myers, Globally Warmed World]; Norman Myers,
Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHIL.
TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. 609 (2001); Myers, supra note 16; Arthur H. Westing,
Environmental Refugees: A Growing Category of Displaced Persons, 19 ENVTL.
CONVERSATION 201 (1992). But see Gaim Kibreab, Environmental Causes and
Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of Current debate, 21 DISASTERS 20
(1997) [hereinafter Kibreab, Environmental Causes]; Kibreab, Refugeehood, supra
note 19, at 116-117; JoAnn McGregor, Refugees and the Environment, in
GEOGRAPHY AND REFUGEES: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE 157, 158-60
(Richard Black & Vaughan Robinson eds., 1993); Richard Black, Environmental
Refugees: Myth or Reality? (EPAU Working Paper No. 34, 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6aOdOO.pdf. See generally ESSAM
EL-HINNAWi, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES (1985).
39. See L. Timberlake et al., Environment and Conflict: Links Between
Ecological Decay, Environmental Bankruptcy and Political and Military Instability
(Earthscan Briefing Document No. 40, 1984).
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rooted in human activities generating increased levels of 'greenhouse
gases' in the atmosphere." 40 It is commonly agreed that climate
change, or what is commonly referred to as global warming, has been
leading to incremental and rapid ecological change and disruption.
Some of the common impacts of climate change are increased
frequency and severity of tropical cyclones, landslides and flooding,
increased droughts, desertification, sea-level rise and coastal
inundation, as well as more frequent extreme weather events.4'
Some analysts have predicted that this is likely to diminish the
human carrying capacity of the environmental resources as reflected
in severe shortages of food, water and energy, as well as extreme
42natural events or processes. Although there may still be a few
dissenting opinions, the science of climate change is recognised by
the majority in the scientific community, many of whom argue that
climate change is likely to have a dramatic effect on human
migration. For example, the Stern Review estimates that by the
middle of the twenty-first century, about 200 million 'climate
refugees' may be permanently displaced due to rising sea-levels,
floods, and droughts.43
Nevertheless, as seen earlier, the impact of climate change on
human migration and conflict is still less clear. Whatever claims
exist on climate change and human migration, as well as climate
change and conflict are indicative or tentative not conclusive. This is
because the state of the current knowledge on the climate change-
migration-conflict nexus is still at its inchoate stage. The thinking
underlying postulation that climate change is likely to trigger massive
human migration is underpinned by the yet unproven but plausible
assumption that climate change can render some environments
uninhabitable or dramatically reduce their productive capacity.
Consequently, the subsistence security of populations whose
40. WISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 136.
41. See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 53; Boko et al., supra note 5.
42. See PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE
SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 1
(2003), available at
www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf.
43. See STERN, supra note 29; see also BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1. For
the extent of climate change for the period between 1000 and 1998 see Fig. 1.
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livelihoods are directly dependent on environmental resources,
sensitive to climate change, may be compromised."
Climate change could lead to variation in the amounts and patterns
of rainfall leading to droughts, floods and sudden onset extreme
weather conditions. It may also lead to the melting of the polar
icecaps leading to sea-level rise and substantial temperature increase
(see Fig. 1) which may adversely affect agricultural production,
fisheries, common resources and other related income-generating
activities. 4 5 A study conducted on the impact of climate change on
Himalayan Glaciers and Glacial Lakes in 2007, for example,
concluded:
The global mean temperature is expected to increase
between 1.4 to 5.8°C over the next hundred years. The
consequences of this change in global climate are already
being witnessed in the Hamilayas where glaciers and
glacial lakes are changing at alarming rates. Himalayan
glaciers are retreating at rates ranging from 10 to 60m per
year and many small glaciers (<0.2 sq. km) have already
disappeared. Our study shows that the terminus of most of
the high altitude valley glaciers in Bhutan, China, and
Nepal are retreating very fast; vertical shifts as great as
100m have been recorded during the last fifty years and
retreat rates of 30m per year are common.46
44. Gleditsch et al., supra note 10, at 1; see also CAMILLO BOANO, ROGER
ZETTER & TIM MORRIS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED
PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE,
LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION (2008) available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/OCHA-
7GMHJF/$file/rscNov2008.pdf?openelement Sara Curran, Migration, Social
Capital, and the Environment: Considering Migrant Selectivity and Networks in
Relation to Coastal Ecosystems, 28 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 89 (2002).
45. STERN, supra note 29, at 81.
46. SAMJWAL R. BAJRACHARYA, PRADEEP K. MOOL & BASANTA R. SHRESTHA,
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR INTEGRATED MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT, IMPACT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HIMALAYAN GLACIERS AND GLACIAL LAKES: CASE STUDIES
ON GLOF AND ASSOCIATED HAzARDS IN NEPAL AND BHUTAN, at xi (2007),
available at http://www.rrcap.unep.org/reports/file/ImpactClimateChange.pdf.
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The consequence of this on the livelihood systems of the
inhabitants is likely to be considerable. In the absence of effective
adaptive capacity and appropriate preemptive or counteracting
measures, such changes may also potentially trigger migration.
In the short and medium-terms, climate change is likely to affect
different areas of the world differently. Whilst some parts of the
world may become too hot and consequently uninhabitable, others
may become fertile and available for agricultural production and
habitation. The IPCC report asserts that by 2020, between 75 and
250 million people may face water shortage due to climate change
and crop yields may be reduced by 50 percent in some regions. 4' The
reduction in agricultural production due to climate change is likely to
be more detrimental to societies whose livelihoods are dependent on
agriculture, such as Africa and South Asia than, the developed world
whose livelihood systems are highly diversified.
Climate change may also have detrimental effects on human health
due to shortage of food, water, malnutrition, diseases, such as
diarrhea, cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations of
ground-level ozone in urban areas, malaria, cholera and yellow
fever. 49
The social impact of climate change or vulnerability to such
change is a function of access to resources, technology, information,
environmental circumstances, and institutional stability and
effectiveness. 50 Those regions, countries and localities with greater
access to resources, information, technology and institutional
capacity are more likely to adapt to climate change than others.
5 1
The IPCC report states, "[v]ulnerability to climate change can be
exacerbated by other stresses. These arise from, for example, current
climate hazards, poverty, unequal access to resources, food
47. Gleditsch et al., supra note 10, at 2.
48. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 50.
49. Id. at 48; Boko et al., supra note 5, at 435.
50. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 56.
51. See Neil W. Adger, Approaches to Vulnerability to Climate Change 5, 20
(Ctr. for Soc. and Econ. Res. on the Global Env't, Working Paper GEC 96-05,
1996), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/pub/wp/gec/gec-1996_05.pdf,
see also Neil W. Adger et al., Adaptation to Climate Change in the Developing
World, 3 PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 179 (2003) [hereinafter Adger et al., Developing
World].
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insecurity, trends in economic globalisation, conflict and incidence of
diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
52
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE, POVERTY AND ADAPTATION
Whether climate change results in massive population
displacement is very much dependent not only on the nature of the
change, but more importantly on the adaptive capacity of the affected
population. 53 However, not only is adaptive capacity dynamic but it
is also a function of "a society's productive base, including natural
and man-made capital assets, social networks and entitlements,
human capital and institutions, governance, national income, health
and technology. It is also affected by multiple climate and non-
climate stresses, as well as development policy." 54  Although all
societies are essentially able to adapt to climate change and other
similar risks, some parts of the ecosystem are more sensitive to
climate change and some groups in society are more vulnerable to
risks posed by climate change than others.
55
Poverty is one of the major constraints on the capacity to cope and
adapt to environmental change. 56 Poor people, due to lack of access
to resources, information, technology and social connections have
very low adaptive capacity. As a result, they tend to be vulnerable to
the damaging effects of climate change and other calamities. In
South East Asia, for example, poverty in combination with socio-
economic and infrastructural constraints limit the ability of people to
conserve biodiversity and to adapt to climate change. 57 As the IPCC
report indicates, countries where there is high incidence of poverty
have lower adaptive capacity.
5 8
52. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 56; see also STERN, supra note 29.
53. WISNER ET AL., supra note 9.
54. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 56.
55. Adger et al., Developing World, supra note 51, at 179.
56. Neil Adger, P. Mick Kelly & Nguyen Huu Ninh, Environment, Society and
Precipitous Change, in LIVING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: SOCIAL
VULNERABILITY, ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE IN VIETNAM 6 (Neil W. Adger, P.
Mick Kelly, & Nguyen Huu Ninh eds., 2001).
57. Navjot S. Sodhi et al., Southeast Asian Biodiversity: An Impending Disaster,
19 TRENDS ECOL. EVOL. 654, 658 (2004).
58. Cruz et al., supra note 5, at 492.
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The corollary is that regions such as Africa have relatively low
adaptive capacity to climate change due to the high level of poverty,
recurrent natural disasters, e.g. droughts and floods. The situation is
further exacerbated by the dominance of rain-fed agriculture and
unfavourable terms of trade resulting from reliance on export of
primary rather than manufactured goods. The IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report, Working Group 1I, states, "Africa is one of the
most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability,
a situation aggravated by the interaction of 'multiple stresses,'
occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity." 59 The report
further states:
Africa's major economic sectors are vulnerable to current
climate sensitivity, with huge economic impacts, and this
vulnerability is exacerbated by existing developmental
challenges such as endemic poverty, complex governance
and institutional dimensions; limited access to capital,
including markets, infrastructure and technology;
ecosystem degradation; and complex disasters and
conflicts. These in turn have contributed to Africa's weak
adaptive capacity, increasing the continent's vulnerability
to projected climate change.6 o
A region's or a country's adaptive capacity is also influenced by
local and national governance, civil and political rights and literacy.
6 1
Although, as stated earlier, there are no evidence-based studies that
examine the link between climate change and migration in Africa,
environmental factors are likely to influence settlements and
population movements. However, this is an empirical question that
needs to be established rather than taken for granted.
The Stern Review asserts that millions of people whose adaptive
capacities and livelihoods are eroded by resource scarcities, droughts,
desertification, floods, and rising sea levels may be left with no other
alternative but to emigrate as a last resort adaptation. It is further
stated that radical climate change could cause large-scale migration
and conflict in some parts of the developing societies. This is likely
59. Boko et al., supra note 5, at 435.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 452.
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to be exacerbated by the fact that the populations in these areas are
expected to grow by an additional 2-3 billion people in the coming
few decades.
62
V. CLIMATE CHANGE AND VULNERABILITY
Nations', communities' and households' responses to
environmental processes and events are widely varied depending on
their vulnerability and resilience. The latter is the function of access
63to rights, resources and assets. Vulnerability refers to "the
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the
impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process)., 64
Wisner et al. further state that some groups are more vulnerable to
hazards in terms of being more prone to damage, loss and suffering in
the face of differing hazards. To them, this differentiated effect is a
reflection of the fact that vulnerability is a function of class,
occupation, ethnicity, caste, gender, disability, health status, age, and
immigration status and social networks. 65 Other analysts use the
concept of vulnerability in terms of capacity of a community, a group
or an individual to resist the damaging effects of hazards and the
ability to recover from their effects with relative ease. 66
Vulnerability is not solely measured in terms of a certain group's
ability to resist, withstand or recover from the deleterious effects of
sudden or slow onset hazards, but also in terms of inability to
reconstruct livelihoods after being struck by such a disaster. This
inability makes the group more vulnerable to the effects of future
disasters.
Vulnerability to the consequences of environmental change is
experienced differently by each household in the face of commonly
faced environmental risk. Whilst some households may adapt to
62. STERN, supra note 29, at 111.
63. Mark Pelling, Paradigms of Risk, in NATURAL DISASTERS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 3, 6, 9, 11 (Mark Pelling ed., 2003); see
also IAN BURTON, ROBERT W. KATES, & GILBERT F. WHITE, THE ENVIRONMENT AS
HAZARD 18-21 (1993).
64. WISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. MARY B. ANDERSON & PETER J. WOODROW, RISING FROM THE ASHES:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN TIMES OF DISASTER 10-11 (1988).
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environmental change by mobilising their economic and social
resources, those without such resources may adapt by resorting to
seasonal or permanent migration. It is important to emphasise,
however, that migration decisions do not always involve whole
families. More often than not, families respond to adverse
environmental changes through diversification of their sources of
income by allocating their family labour to different economic
activities in different locations. This may mean that whilst some
family members stay at home to prepare the farms for the next
season, others may migrate in search of income-generating activities.
Some family members may also migrate to relief camps to benefit
from food rations. It is only when the basis of subsistence is
completely eroded that families and groups adopt migration as a
means of overcoming the threat of vulnerability to hunger and in
extreme circumstances to famine. 67
Migration is one of the myriad coping strategies people inhabiting
drought-prone areas adopt. Such people, i.e. those living in arid and
semi-arid areas have well-developed varieties of adaptation
mechanisms and coping strategies that underpin their capability to
cope with the consequences of slow onset processes and extreme and
unpredictable climatic events. Coping refers to the manner in which
people act within the limits of available resources and range of
expectations to achieve various ends. 68  It involves defence
mechanisms which enable the group concerned to resist or withstand
the effects of hazards, ability to solve problems, as well as to develop
methods of handling stress. 6
9
People in disaster prone environments are faced with recurrent
crises which require effective mobilisation of resources,
diversification of income sources either to minimise their effects or to
cope with their impact. The people often develop the capacity to
predict future similar events based on their past experiences as well
as the capacity to cope with such adversity.70 Such coping strategies
are built on the basis of the assumption that the future hazard is likely
to be similar to the one that struck in the past and inasmuch as most
67. See GAIM KIBREAB, REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF
ERITREA 269-73 (1987).
68. WISNER ET AL., supra note 9.
69. Id. at 113.
70. Id. at 115.
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disasters tend to have precedents, especially in hazardous social and
physical environments, such knowledge constitutes the edifice of the
foundation on which such population's coping strategies rest.
71
In the Horn of Africa where the majority of the rural populations
live dangerously close to the subsistence margin, pastoralists' and
small farmers' adaptation to the stern weather conditions reflected in
erratic and inadequate rainfall include raising different species of
livestock, e.g. camels, cattle, sheep and goats. During dry seasons,
water is conserved by keeping camels away from water points or
wells for at least one week. Cattle are brought to wells or water points
once every three days, sheep every other day and goats every day.
72
Grazing resources are also conserved through rotational grazing.
Often dry cattle and camels are kept away from settlements and only
milking cattle and goats are kept around settlements. Small farmers
on the other hand avoid or minimise the risk of crop failure or low
crop yields by growing fast maturing and less thirsty crop varieties.73
These resource and land use practices constitute the central thrust of
the coping strategies that enable the inhabitants of the stern
environment to cope in adversity.
At the national level, the degree of vulnerability of a country, a
community or a household is to a large extent influenced by social,
economic and institutional factors. This suggests, therefore, that
climate changes, whether sudden or slow onset, do not occur in a
socio-economic and institutional vacuum. Consequently, their effects
are spatially and socially differentiated.
VI. CLIMATE CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTIES
In spite of the recent advances on the science of climate change,
there are many uncertainties regarding the various assertions hitherto
made on the link between climate change and migration. For
example, there is a tendency to take for granted the negative impact
of climate change on precipitation, food insecurity and water supply.
There are studies to show that the relationship is not that
71. Id.
72. KIBREAB, STATE INTERVENTION, supra note 37, at 254-56.
73. Kibreab, Environmental Causes, supra note 38, at 22; KIBREAB, supra note
7, at 134-35; see also KIBREAB, STATE INTERVENTION, supra note 37.
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straightforward. The Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the IPCC states:
While climate models are generally consistent regarding
the direction of warming in Africa, projected changes in
precipitation are less consistent .... The links between
land-use changes, climate stress and possible feedbacks are
not yet clearly understood. The contribution of climate to
food insecurity in Africa is still not fully understood,
particularly the role of other multiple stresses that enhance
impacts of droughts and floods and possible future climate
change. While drought may affect production in some
years, climate variability alone does not explain the limits
of food production in Africa. Better models and methods
to improve understanding of multiple stresses, particularly
at a range of scales, e.g. global, regional and local, and
including the role of climate change and variability, are
therefore required .... Impacts in the water sector, while
addressed by global-and regional-scale model
assessments, are still relatively poorly researched,
particularly for local assessments and for ground water
impacts .... There is still much uncertainty in assessing
the role of climate change in complex systems that are
shaped by interacting multiple stressors.
74
The reason why climate change is said to constitute a major cause
of displacement is because of its potentially detrimental effect on
precipitation, food security and water supply. The implication of
these findings is, therefore, critical in the sense that it is important to
exercise caution when predicting the effect of climate change on
human migration. The relationship is still tenuous.
The impact of climate change on human migration is equally
uncertain. This is underscored by a study undertaken by the
International Migration Organisation (IOM) in which it is stated:
Considering the volume of recent academic and policy
publications about the impacts that climate change might
74. Boko et al., supra note 5, at 457.
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have on migration, the number of empirical studies of
contemporary manifestations of the influence of climate on
migration is surprisingly small. Of these, empirical results
of the impact of drought on migration have found, that
drought seems to cause an increase in the number ofpeople
who engage in short-term rural to rural types of migration,
but does not affect, or even decrease international, long-
distance moves.75
The IOM study further states that studies on the effect of
hurricanes on migration have produced even fewer results than the
studies that examined the impact of drought on migration.76 The
study is consistent with the findings of the Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC which
concluded that the assumption that environmental change inevitably
leads to population displacement is not backed by empirical evidence.
In all societies where livelihood systems are derived directly from
renewable resources, such as land, water and common property
resources, the environment has always been one of the direct or
indirect multiple drivers of migration. Like in all social phenomena
that result from a combination of inextricably interwoven multiple
factors, it is methodologically and empirically difficult to determine
with an acceptable degree of accuracy the factors that induce people
to move. Migration whether it is forced or voluntary must always be
seen as a complex multi-causal phenomenon.
However, although it may be statistically possible to establish the
contribution of each factor using multivariate statistical analysis,
correlation is not the same as causation. This leads to difficulty in
isolating the role of each of the multiple factors that cause migration,
including the environment in the calculus of migrants' decision-
making. Understanding human motivation, including the decision to
migrate even in the presence of seemingly apparent explanations is
one of the most complicated problems analysts in refugee and
75. Dominic Kniveton et al., Climate Change and Migration: Improving
Methodologies to Estimate Flows 6 (International Organization for Migration,
Research Series No. 33, 2008), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/PANA-
7FNH8T/$file/IOM-june2008.pdf?openelement.
76. Id. at 35.
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migration studies face. Appearances notwithstanding, migration
decisions are complex because, inter alia, people migrate for a
variety of reasons. As a result, it is difficult to establish causal
relations between the environment and migration. As Vikram
Kolmannskog perceptively argues:
Humans are not entities that can be understood easily
within the natural science reductionist/isolationist cause
and effect framework. Migrants should no more than
others be reduced to and seen as mere passive victims.
There is a myriad of factors in a person's life that may
motivate him or her to act in one way or another and the
degree of force will vary.77
As noted earlier, climate change as a cause of displacement cannot
be isolated from other inextricably interacting factors. When people
are exposed to external stressors, including climate change or
violence, their responses are rarely identical. Irrespective of the
severity of the exposure to external pressure, migration is one of a
variety of responses or options that the affected populations resort to.
This is because, inter alia, people's resource endowments and
consequently their adaptive capacities are varied. Drawing some
insights from a previous study conducted by the author, on the
dynamics of forced migration among Eritreans who were exposed to
drought and imminent danger of violence,78 an attempt is made here
to discuss the potential responses to climate change.
During the thirty years' war of Eritrean independence, the large
majority of Eritreans were subjected to gruesome violence. 79
Notwithstanding the fact that people were subjected to similar life-
threatening circumstances, different individuals and groups
responded differently to the threats. The responses of the people,
facing imminent dangers to their lives, fell under six categories. One
77. VIKRAM 0. KOLMANNSKOG, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, FUTURE
FLOODS OF REFUGEES: A COMMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONFLICT AND FORCED
MIGRATION 11 (2008), available at http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf, see
also Lamprey, supra note 14.
78. See KIBREAB, supra note 67; Gaim Kibreab, Rural Refugee Land
Settlements in Eastern Sudan: On the Road to Self-Sufficiency?, in REFUGEES AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 63, 63-71 (Peter Nobel ed., 1987).
79. See KIBREAB, supra note 67, at 15.
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group, the large majority, adopted a 'wait and see' attitude and stayed
put in spite of their awareness that this option was risky. A second
group abandoned their places of origin and became internally
displaced temporarily until the intensity of the threat eased. A third
group, albeit a few, accepted the option of being relocated to state-
designated 'security villages' or commonly known as 'strategic
hamlets.' A fourth group abandoned their villages and relocated to
the rebel-controlled or liberated areas. A fifth group joined the
liberation struggle to be part of the forces that were determined to
eliminate the root and proximate causes of the violence that disrupted
their lives. A sixth group crossed an international border in search of
protection or refugee status.
Although five out of the six responses involved some form of
movement, the nature of the movements in terms of destination,
length of stay and the profile of the movers varied considerably.
80
For the majority of the categories, migration was a mechanism of
adaptation resorted to in response to adverse circumstances which
were perceived as being transient. For those who fled the country to
seek protection in a neighbouring country or far afield, migration was
a manifestation of inability to adapt to adverse circumstances.
The insight drawn from this experience is that when people are
faced with severe environmental problems precipitated by climate
change, some may depending on their degree of vulnerability and
coping capacity stay put and face the consequences. However, this
can only happen when the environmental stressor in question is not
related to sudden onset natural disaster, such as floods, forest fires,
hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tornadoes or
sudden/man-made disasters, such as the Bhopal chemical spill, and
the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. In the case of gradual
natural/man-made disasters, such as desertification, land degradation,
global sea rise induced by global warming, deforestation and aquifer
depletion, the large majority of the affected populations are likely to
stay put and face the consequences.
Another group may, depending on their resources, undertake pre-
emptive, adaptive or restorative measures to alleviate the adverse
effects of the environmental stressors. This option may be adopted as
an additional measure to offset, countervail or alleviate the effect of
climate change, inter alia, by diversification of sources of income.
80. See id.
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Different family members may thus engage in diverse income-
generating activities, such as wage labor, petty trade, handicrafts, and
raising of different species of livestock without being uprooted from
their places of habitation. Like Eritreans, others may become IDPs
while a few may cross international borders in search of alternative
livelihood and settlement. It is for these reasons that it is difficult to
predict the responses of people subjected to stressors of climate
change.
This is further complicated by the fact that neither the environment
nor migrants are homogenous. Some environments are sensitive to
human interference and natural processes, but others are more
resilient in terms of their capacity of absorption of the effects and
shocks, as well in terms of their recovery from such effects or
shocks. 81 For example, there is ample evidence to show that the
environment in the arid and semi-arid regions of the world is less
sensitive and more resilient than in the rest of the world. This is
acknowledged in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in which it is
stated, "impacts of climate change may occur beyond certain
thresholds in the ability of some ecosystems to adapt without
dramatic change in their functions and resilience. The inherent
sensitivity of some ecosystems, habitats and even species with
extremely narrow ranges of biogeographic adaptability will also limit
the options and effectiveness of adaptation.'
8 2
VII.THE DEBATE ON 'ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES'
The term environmental refugee was coined by Lester Brown of
the World Watch Institute in the 1970s. In 1984, the term was used
in an Earthscan's publication.8 3 In 1985, Essam el-Hinnawi of the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defined
'environmental refugees' as "those people who have been forced to
81. B. H. Walker & I. Noy-Meir, Aspects of the Stability and Resilence of
Savanna Ecosystems, in ECOLOGY OF TROPICAL SAVANNAS: ECOLOGICAL STUDIES,
ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 556, 556-57 (B. J. Huntley & B. H. Walker eds., 1982);
B. H. Walker, Stable Production Versus Resilience: A Grazing Management
Conflict, 15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE GRASSLAND SOC'Y OF SO. AFR. 79 (1980); B. H.
Walker et al., Stability of Semi-Arid Savanna Grazing Systems, 69 J. ECOL. 473
(1981).
82. Cruz et al., supra note 5, at 492.
83. Timberlake et al., supra note 39.
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leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of
a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by
people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the
quality of their life.",84 El-Hinnawi identified three categories of
'environmental refugees,' namely, those who are displaced
temporarily, but return when the factors that prompted them to flee
cease to exist; those who move permanently and are settled
elsewhere; and those who migrate from their homes of origin
temporarily or permanently because the environment on which their
livelihoods depend are degraded and are consequently unable to eke
out a living. 85
According to Jodi Jacobson of the Worldwatch Institute, the term
'environmental refugee' was used in 1984 in reference to the Haitian
boat people. 86 In her view, the extent of land degradation in the
country was so bad that people had no choice but to take the
dangerous journey to south Florida thereby becoming the first
'environmental refugees' in the world. She identified the causes of
this environmentally-induced displacement as land degradation,
unsustainable farming methods, high rate of population growth and
over cultivation which led to land exhaustion and industrial waste. 87
She distinguishes between three types of environmental refugees,
namely:
[T]hose displaced temporarily due to local disruption such
as an avalanche or earthquake; those who migrate because
environmental degradation has undermined their livelihood
or poses unacceptable risks to health; and those who
resettle because land degradation has resulted in
desertification or because of other permanent and untenable
changes in their habitat. 88
In 1989, a former UNDP official, David Barker, defined
'environmental refugee' as referring "to individuals whose movement
is caused by a combination of environmental and political and/or who
84. EL-H1NNAWI, supra note 38, at 4.
85. Id. at 4-5.
86. See generally JACOBSON, supra note 38.
87. Id. at 8-9.
88. Id. at 37-38.
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are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their
own countries in dealing with the impacts of environmental
disruptions."
' 89
Anthony Catanese identifies David Barker's definition of
'environmental refugees' as the clearest especially because it "uses
Haiti's deforestation as an example of 'slow-onset disruptions."'
These environmental disruptions "have complex root causes in which
ecological and human activities interact over extended periods,
leaving large numbers of people vulnerable." 90 Barker further argues
that these "causal factors are mutually interdependent; they create
feedback which accelerates the process and reduces the capacity of
the ecosystems to regenerate themselves."
91
Barker's definition is inextricably linked to the state or the
government sector and specifically to the slow-onset disruptions
caused by humans and more importantly by government agents. The
interdependence of ecological, economic and political factors in
prompting people to flee was first recognised by Mats Lundahl. 92
DeWind and Kinley, as well as Lundahl argue that the predatory
Haitian government relentlessly abused the agricultural environment
and consequently eroded the basis of the livelihood systems of the
Haitian population. 93  Norman Myers defined 'environmental
refugees' as "people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in
their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion,
desertification, and other environmental problems. In their
desperation, they feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary
elsewhere, however, hazardous the attempt."
94
An important question that arises is whether people who emigrate
due to actual or perceived threat to sources of livelihoods should be
defined as refugees. The definitions presented in the preceding
paragraphs have nothing in common with Article IA of the 1951
U.N. Convention which defines refugees as:
89. ANTHONY V. CATANESE, HAITIANS: MIGRATION AND DIASPORA 50 (1999).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. MATS LUNDAHL, THE HAITIAN ECONOMY: MAN, LAND AND MARKETS 39-
40 (1983); Mats Lundahl, A Note on Haitian Migraiton to Buba, 1890-1934, 12
CUBAN STUDIES 22 (1982).
93. CATANESE, supra note 89, at 51.
94. Myers, Globally Warmed World, supra note 38, at 752.
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[A]ny person who.., owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 95
Persons whose displacement is environmentally-induced do not
flee from 'well-founded fear of persecution.' As a result, the use of
the term 'refugee' to refer to persons whose displacement is
prompted by environmental degradation would point to nature as the
persecuting agent instead of man's unsustainable use of resources.9 6
Neither the environment nor climate change can by any stretch of the
imagination fall under the five reasons-race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion-
stipulated in the 1951 U.N. Convention. Unlike refugees who cross
an international border to seek asylum because of 'well-founded fear
of persecution,' most environmentally-induced migrants are likely to
remain within their countries of origin.
The only time environmentally-induced displacees may be
regarded as 'refugees' is when the state uses environment as an
instrument of political oppression. This is because at the heart of the
notion of persecution lies state failure to provide protection. This
happens when the state is either the perpetrator of persecution or is
unwilling or unable to protect its citizens against harm perpetrated by
non-state actors. None of this is true in environmentally-induced
displacement save the exception in which a state may use the
environment as an instrument of persecution. As Renaud et al. state,
"[u]nless it is assumed that 'nature' or the 'environment' can be the
95. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 137-38, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/refigees.pdf.
96. See Boko et al., supra note 5, at 450; see also STERN, supra note 29.
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persecutor, the term refugee does not appear suitable for describing
those displaced by environmental factors .... 97
Notwithstanding this fact, some scholars, including Renaud et al. 98
prefer to refer to those who are allegedly displaced by drought and
environmental degradation as 'environmental refugees.' 99  For
example, William Wood identifies a specific sub-set of a category of
refugees who can be regarded as 'true 'environmental refugees.'
This sub-category in his view includes people who are victimised by
an explicit 'ecocidal' policies or activities of oppressive regimes.
The Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq or refugees whose repatriation
opportunities are stifled by the littering of their homelands with
landmines or destruction of infrastructure by combatants or
government forces.' 
00
The question to ask however is why the Marsh Arabs of Southern
Iraq cannot be considered political refugees rather than
'environmental refugees.' Wood further notes that "this ecological
destruction is less the root cause of refugee flight and more the means
of military oppression."' 0' 1 As such, people who are targeted and
militarily oppressed as was the case of the Marsh Arabs are refugees
and it is unclear why Wood prefers to describe them as
'environmental refugees.' However, his observation that the
environment is a relevant factor in all types of migration, including in
refugee flights is apt. The reaction of migration specialists to the
advent of the concept of 'environmental refugee' has been to say the
least, lukewarm, and its use has been heavily criticised and rejected
by forced migration and refugee studies scholars.' 
02
Graeme Hugo suggests that the term 'environmental migrant' is
more appropriate than 'environmental refugee,' and although he
agrees with Richmond's assertion that, "the reality of external and
97. FABRICE RENAUD ET AL., CONTROL, ADAPT OR FLEE: HOW TO FACE
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION? 14 (Institute for Environment and Human Security,
U.N. Univ., Intersections Publication Series No. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=259.
98. Id.
99. Timberlake et al., supra note 39; see also EL-HINNAWI, supra note 38, at 4-
5; JACOBSON, supra note 38, at 6.
100. Wood, supra note 24, at 46.
101. Id.
102. McGregor, supra note 38, at 157-58; see also Black, supra note 38;
Kibreab, Refugeehood, supra note 19, at 122-25.
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internal migration induced mainly, or partly, by environmental
factors cannot be denied,"' 10 3 he argues that environmental change is
a factor that leads to involuntary migration and should be recognised
academically and politically as such. 104 In his view, the major
difference between political and civil conflict induced and
environment-induced displacement is that whilst in the latter the
affected people can seek refuge within their own countries, the
former flee to seek asylum in another country. 1
05
Renaud et al. define a forced environmental migrant "as a person
who 'has' to leave his/her place of normal residence because of an
environmental stressor (...) as opposed to an environmentally
motivated migrant who is a person who 'may' decide to move
because of an environmental stressor."' 10 6  To them, what
distinguishes forced environmental migrant from environmentally
motivated migrant is the degree of severity of the stressor. If the
stressor is so severe that it leaves the people concerned with no other
option but to leave their homes, those people are according to Renaud
et al.'s definition refugees or forced environmental migrants. There
is nothing wrong with their definition. It is their use of this
description interchangeably with the term 'refugee' that makes it
problematic. They argue "in this essay we retain the term refugee to
characterize people precipitously fleeing their place of residence
because of an environmental stressor regardless of whether or not
they cross an international border."' 1 7 The question that arises is:
how could the term 'refugee' apply to a person who has not crossed
an international border and whose flight has nothing to do with state
failure to protect?
VIII.THE MAGNITUDE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED
MIGRANTS/'REFUGEES'
Assuming it is possible to distinguish environmentally displaced
persons from other types of migrants, it is interesting to estimate the
number. In spite of many bold attempts to invent such figures, the
honest answer is no body knows how many they are because no one
103. Hugo, supra note 24, at 109.
104. See id. at 107-08.
105. Id. at 109.
106. Renaud et al., supra note 97, at 11-12.
107. Id. at 14.
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has counted them. Besides, given the multi-causal nature of the
factors that prompt them to migrate; they are not easy to distinguish
from other types of migrants save those who are displaced by
extreme climatic events. This is exacerbated by the fact that there is
no agreed definition of what constitutes an 'environmental refugee.'
However, this has not deterred some analysts from attempting to
estimate the number of what they call 'environmental refugees." In
1989, Myers stated, "[a]lthough there are no accurate breakdown
figures, the author believes, on the basis of 24 years' residence in the
region [Africa], that many more refugees deserve to be classified
primarily as environmental refugees rather than as political
refugees."10 8  El-Hinnawi estimated the total number of
environmental refugees at 30 million in 1985 while UNEP's director
predicted that the total number of environmental refugees will reach
50 million by the end of 2010.109 We are already in 2010 and there is
no evidence to suggest that this happened. In 2005, Myers stated:
As far back as 1995 (latest date for a comprehensive
assessment), these environmental refugees totalled at least
25 million people, compared with 27 million traditional
refugees .... The environmental refugees total could well
double between 1995 and 2010. Moreover, it could
increase steadily for a good while thereafter as growing
numbers of impoverished people press ever harder on over-
loaded environments. When global warming takes hold,
there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by
disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes,
by droughts of unprecedented severity and duration, and by
sea level-rise and coastalflooding. 110
He further opined that by 2050 there will be 30 million
environmental refugees in China, 30 million in India, 15 million in
Bangladesh, 14 million in Egypt, 10 million in other delta areas and
108. Kibreab, Refugeehood, supra note 19, at 116 (quoting Norman Myers,
Population Growth, Environmental Decline and Security Issues in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in ECOLOGY AND POLITICS 211, 253 (Anders Hjort af Ornas & M. A.
Mohammed Salih eds. 1989)).
109. BOANO ET AL., supra note 44, at 12.
110. MYERS & KENT, supra note 38, at 1 (emphasis added).
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coastal zones, one million in Island states, and 50 million in
agriculturally dislocated areas-in total 150 million. 11  Myers'
figures are invariably quoted or referred to by those who want to
show the 'catastrophic' or dramatic effects of climate change,
including by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (TPCC)
and the Stern Review. But, as Oli Brown perceptively states,
"repetition does not make the figure any more accurate."' 12 This
figure, even by Myers' admission, involved some "heroic
extrapolations" 13 and cannot therefore be used for evidence-based
policy formulation. None of the figures referred to above are based
on either total enumeration or representative sample. They are all
manufactured by well-meaning analysts and environmental lobbyists
who on the one hand, wrongly believe that it is possible to isolate
climate change as a cause of migration and on the other, want to warn
the world that it is 'sleep walking into a disaster.'
In 2005, the U.N. University's Institute for Environment and
Human Security predicted that by 2010, there will be 50 million
'environmental refugees.' 114 According to the Stern Review, "[t]he
total number of people at risk of displacement or migration in
developing countries is very large. This ranges from the millions at
risk of malnutrition and lack of clean water to those currently living
in flood plains." 1 5 The report notes that, "[w]orldwide, nearly 200
million people today live in coastal flood zones that are at risk; in
South Asia alone, the number exceeds 60 million people. ' ' 16  In
addition, there are potentially between 30 to 200 million people at
risk of hunger with temperature rises of 2 to 30C-rising to 250 to
550 million people with a 3°C warming; and between 0.7 to 4.4
billion people who will experience growing water shortages with a
temperature rise of 2C. 117
111. Myers, Globally Warmed World, supra note 38 at 757.
112. OLI BROWN, MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (Int'l Org. for Migration,
Res. Ser. No. 31, 2008).
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. at 11. It is 2010 and there is no indication to suggest that there has been
marked change since this prediction was made in 2005.
115. STERN, supra note 29, at 111.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 112; see also supra Fig. 1.
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The IPCC also predicted that by 2050, there will be about 150
million environmental refugees.ll8 Nicholls also observed that by
2080, between 50 and 200 million people may be displaced by
climate change. 119 Friends of the Earth estimate that the total number
of climate refugees will reach 200 million world-wide by 2050.120
According to UNEP, in Africa alone, there could be as many as 50
million environmental refugees. Christian Aid's figures are
astronomical--one billion people could be permanently displaced by
2050-250 million due to climate change-related occurrences, such
as droughts, floods, and hurricanes and 645 million by dams and
other development projects. 121
The absence of accurate figures should not be construed to imply
that sudden onset climate events do not displace very large numbers
of people. This is not a moot point. For example, Hurricane Andrew
which hit the southern tip of Florida on 24 August in 1992 displaced
353,000 people temporarily and according to Stanley Smith and
Christopher McCarty, about 40,000 people left the county
permanently as a direct result of the hurricane. 22 Hurricane Katrina,
which devastated the Gulf Coast of the United States in August 2005,
temporarily displaced over a million people.123 It is not clear how
many of these people will leave the county permanently. The Indian
Ocean tsunami that hit a dozen of Asian and African countries on 26
December 2004, resulted in 230,000 dead or missing people and 2.1
million displaced. 124 More specifically, the tsunami, which affected
118. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH AUSTRALIA, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CLIMATE
REFUGEES 11 (2007), available at
http://www.foe.org.au/resources/publications/climate-justice/CitizensGuide.pdf
119. Id. (citing Robert J. Nicholls, Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in the
21st Century: Changes under the SRES Climate and Socioeconomic Scenarios, 14
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 69 (2004)).
120. Id.
121. Sustainable Development and Much More, Over a Billion Climate Change
Refugees in 2050?, http://www.elrst.com/2008/05/19/over-a-billion-climate-
refugees-in-2050, (May 19, 2008) ("According to two sources-UNHCR and the
NGO Christian Aid-as much as a billion people may find themselves homeless or
stateless by the middle of the century.").
122. Stanley K. Smith & Christopher McCarty, Demographic Effects of Natural
Disasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Andrew, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 265, 265 (1996).
123. Button & Oliver-Smith, supra note 2 at 123.
124. AlertNet.org, Indian Ocean Tsunami,
http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/SA_TID.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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13 countries, displaced 2,089,883 people, destroyed the livelihoods of
1.5 million people, and destroyed 392,544 houses whose
reconstruction cost was estimated at $10,375 billion. 125
The extent to which the tsunami is linked to climate change is not
clear. The British government's chief scientific advisor, Professor
King, warned, "[t]he tsunami disaster underlines the threat posed by
climate change."' 126 He further stated, "[w]hat is happening in the
Indian Ocean underlines the importance of the earth's system to our
ability to live safely. And what we are talking about in terms of
climate change is something that is really driven by our own use of
fossil fuels, so this is something we can manage."' 127 However, Dr.
Klaus Toepfer, the director of the U.N. Environment Programme,
asserted that the tsunami and changing climate were not linked, but
warned, "it would be a huge mistake to concentrate on just one threat
while giving less attention to the second."' 128
It is not disputed here that environmental degradation is one of the
main drivers of migration. It is also foolhardy to deny that the role of
the environment in population displacement is likely to intensify with
the dramatic climate change that is in the process of unfolding world-
wide. What is rejected here is the application of the term 'refugee' to
those whose migration is triggered by environmental degradation
without reference to state action or inaction. 12
9
To the author's knowledge, hitherto none of the well-meaning
analysts who uncritically apply the term 'environmental refugee' to
describe those who flee due to climate processes reflected in slow
onset changes, such as sea-level rise induced by global warming, land
degradation, desertification, deforestation, aquifer depletion, growing
water scarcity and food insecurity, as well as climate events such as
cyclones, floods, tsunamis, hurricanes, typhoons, forest fires has
125. Id.




128. Alex Kirby, Beware Tsunamis and Climate-UN, BBC NEWS, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/4152331 .stm.
129. See McGregor, supra note 38, at 157; see also Kibreab, Environmental
Causes, supra note 38; Kibreab, Refugeehood, supra note 19, at 116; Black, supra
note 38.
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provided convincing scientific and systematic argument to justify
their position.
Although there has recently been a new surge of academic and
policy interest in the issue of 'environmental refugee' as a result of
the debate on climate change and projected large numbers of
population displacement, the substance of the debate has not
progressed beyond what it was in the 1990s.
In the remaining part of the article, the arguments and counter
arguments concerning whether or not environmentally displaced
persons or what some analysts refer to as 'environmental refugees'
should be accorded similar rights and protection as those available to
political refugees will briefly be discussed.
IX. THE DEBATE ON PROTECTION OF FORCED ENVIRONMENTAL
MIGRANTS
In 1989, David Barker argued that "the distinctions between
environmental migrants and environmental refugees are not just
semantic." ' 30 Environmental refugees," he said, "unlike others who
move, require outside protection of the actions, or in some cases
inactions, of their own countries against them."' 131 The distinction
between environmental migrants and environmental refugees,
according to Barker, is that in the latter, the state is culpable and only
those whose displacement is attributable to state culpability either in
terms of its actions or inactions "'require outside protection"'
because they have lost the protection of their government.' 32 It
seems that Barker is talking about only those who have fled their
country to seek protection elsewhere because the state has destroyed
the single most important source of their livelihood-land. Those
who are displaced internally for the same reasons are excluded from
his realm of protection. And so are those who emigrate due to
environmental degradation but in which there is no direct or indirect
state collusion or culpability. This is a very reasonable position
except that the group which Barker refers to as 'environmental
refugees' can be accorded protection as political refugees.
130. CATANESE, supra note 89, at 50.
131. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
132. Id.
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In 2003, the New Economic Foundation forcefully argues that
people displaced by environmental change regardless of state
involvement directly or indirectly should be accorded protection and
the cost of catering for their needs should be met by the culpable or
pollutant states. 133 As we shall see in the following paragraphs,
although the reasoning underlying Molly Conisbee's and Andrew
Simms' arguments are different from those espoused by scholars of
the 1980s and 1990s, they argue in favour of granting the same rights
and protection to those who are displaced by climate change as
refugees. 134 In their view, "[t]he case for expanding the Geneva
Convention to include those displaced by environmental degradation
is based on the notion that the environment can be used as an
instrument of harm."' 35  They further point out, "the Geneva
Convention should be expanded to incorporate a category of
'environmental persecution' ... [the] Convention defines a refugee
as someone forced to flee because of a well-founded fear of
persecution." In their view, "[a] well-founded fear of starvation or
drowning is a compelling reason to escape."'136 No one can dispute
the fact that the threats posed by climate change and their effects on
subsistence security constitute a 'compelling reason' to force people
to flee. But does that fact alone make them refugees? The New
Economic Foundation and like-minded analysts and lobbyists do not
seem to realise the danger of opening the Refugee Convention for
renegotiation in the current context of inauspicious political and
economic climate.
Renaud et al. state:
Interestingly, Kibreab argues that the term 'environmental
refugee' was "invented at least in part to depoliticise the
causes of displacement, so enabling states to derogate their
obligation to provide asylum. The rationale is that states
have no obligation to provide asylum to those who flee
their homes because of environmental deterioration rather
than political persecution. In international refugee law,
133. See MOLLY CONISBEE & ANDREW SiMMS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: THE
CASE FOR RECOGNITION (2003).
134. Id.; see also RENAUD ET AL., supra note 97.
135. CONISBEE & SiMMS, supra note 133, at 30.
136. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
2009]
394 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW
environmental conditions do not constitute a basis for
international protection." We argue, to the contrary, that
environmental conditions should be considered as one
element forcing people to flee their places of origin and as
such should be afforded similar rights and protection as
refugees fleeing because of other causes. 137
Inasmuch as people flee due to interplay between inextricably
interwoven factors, such as war, conflict, persecution, economic
hardship and environmental degradation, evidently, the environment
must be factored in as one of the diverse elements that drive
migration. In that sense, Renaud et al.'s contention is not a moot
point. However, what they leave unexplained is the fact that if forced
environmental migrants, as they argue, are people who are forced to
relocate internally or across international borders due to
environmental deterioration, on what grounds can the term 'refugee'
be applied to describe them? Furthermore, on what grounds are they
to be accorded similar rights and protection as those whose flight is
prompted by political persecution perpetrated by the state or by non-
state actors in the context of state complicity or impotence? Renaud
et al. and other scholars who share these views fail to address this
critical question and therefore leave their readers in limbo.
If people whose displacement is prompted by severe environmental
stressors are to be accorded similar rights and protection as refugees,
is there a reason why such rights and protection should not be
extended to all persons who flee life threatening conditions regardless
of the cause or the nature of the stressor? After all, persons who are
forced to migrate because of environmental stressor, no matter how
severe, are fundamentally doing so because their place of origin or
habitual residence has become hazardous for human habitation or the
productive capacity of resources is severely depleted. What this
essentially suggests is that people who migrate due to environmental
degradation or climate change, in the absence of state complicity or
culpability, no matter the severity of the deterioration, are
indistinguishable from people who abandon their places of origin due
to severe economic hardship in search of employment, food relief or
self-employment.
137. RENAUD ET AL., supra note 97, at 14 (internal citations omitted, emphasis
added).
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In view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of forced
environmental migrants are likely to relocate themselves within their
countries of origin, is there any rationale that justifies the use of the
term 'refugees' rather than IDPs to describe them? According to
paragraph 2 of the Introduction of The Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, IDPs are:
[P]ersons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to
leave their homes or places of habitual residence in
particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of,
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized state border.' 
38
The reasons most well-meaning advocacy groups and some
scholars mainly apply the term 'refugee' to environmentally
displaced persons is to highlight their plight and to raise public
awareness. No person, scholar or otherwise, would argue against the
need to provide material and technical assistance to those whose
livelihoods are threatened or are eliminated by climate change.
However, the obvious question that arises is: do they need to be
defined as 'refugees' considering that refugees are people who have
lost not only their livelihoods and all their possessions, but also the
protection of their governments? On the contrary, environmentally
displaced persons are people who have lost their livelihoods not
because they are targeted by their governments or their governments
are unwilling to help them. It is this that defines the fundamental
difference between refugees and environmental migrants.
Nevertheless, the fact that people displaced by natural or man-made
disasters are included in the definition of Guidelines on IDPs
indicates the need for protection and assistance of persons who are
displaced within the territories of their own countries is clearly
recognised not within but outside the international refugee protection
regime.
The question of whether the international protection regime should
be extended to accommodate the protection and material needs of
138. Francis Deng, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 33 INT'L
MIGRATION REv. 484, 465-66 (1999) (emphasis added).
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new categories of displaced persons whose advent was envisaged
neither by the lawyers who drafted the Refugee Convention nor by
the states that ratified it has been one of the most vexing problems
facing the international community. The initial temporal and the
geographic limitations in the 1951 U.N. Convention indicated that the
refugee problem was conceived as a European problem and as such a
transient one. However, the conflicts that accompanied the
decolonisation process and nation-building generated large numbers
of displaced populations in areas where there was a gap in the
international protection regime. One way by which the international
community responded to the new developments was by employing
the 'good offices' doctrine in which UNHCR was authorised by the
U.N. General Assembly to provide protection and assistance in
particular countries where it did not have a mandate. Between 1957
and 1962, many such resolutions were adopted. Those who benefited
from the UNHCR 'good offices' doctrine included IDPs, returnees
and people in refugee-like situations. 139
Even though the temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951
U.N. Convention were eliminated by the adoption of the 1967
Protocol relating to refugee status, the large majority of those who
were displaced by the conflicts and tensions that permeated the
decolonisation process and nation-building remained outside the
purview of the Convention. In response, the OAU Convention
Relating the Specific Refugee Problem in Africa was adopted in
1969. The OAU Convention considerably broadened the definition
of the term refugee by including "external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order"140 as
additional grounds for claiming a refugee status. The Cartagena
139. See GAIM KIBREAB, THE STATE OF THE ART REvIEw OF REFUGEE STUDIES
IN AFRICA (Uppsala Papers in Economic History, Res. Rep. No. 26, 1991); see also.
G.A. Res. 1784 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 7, 1962); G.A. Res. 1672 (XVI),
U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Dec. 18, 1961); G.A. Res. 1500 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/4684
(Dec. 5, 1960); G.A. Res. 1389 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959); G.A.
Res. 1388 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959); G.A. Res. 1286 (XIII), U.N.
Doc. A/4090 (Dec. 5, 1958); G.A. Res. 1167 (XII), U.N. Doc. A/3805 (Nov. 26,
1957); G.A. Res. 1129 (XI), U.N. Doc. 3572 (Nov. 21, 1956); Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Declaration de Cartagena, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1984-1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1985).
140. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
art. 1 § 2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
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Declaration also adopted similar formulation in which it was stated
that people who flee from "generalised violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other events
which have seriously disturbed public order, could be granted a
refugee status." 
14 1
However, in spite of the expanded definition of the term 'refugee,'
many categories still remained outside the realm of the protection
regime and this led to proliferation of diverse, but ill-defined and
confusing terminologies, such as 'mass distressed migrants,'
'environmental refugees,' 'persons in refugee-like situations,'
'persons of concern to UNHCR,' 'internally displaced persons,'
'environmental refugees,' 'economic refugees,' and 'climate change
refugees.' In the global north, some of these categories are referred
to as 'bogus refugees,' 'asylum shoppers.' 142 This has led to calls by
some social scientists for either the broadening of the definition to
encompass all or most of these categories or the creation of a special
international apparatus to deal with the category of IDP. 143 Zolberg
et al., for example, strongly argued in favour of broadening the
definition of the term refugee to include even those persons who flee
their places of origin because of being subjected to life-threatening
violence. It was argued:
Movement is most clearly involuntary when it is forced-
that is, when it occurs as a response to life-threatening
violence, exercised by an agent or occurring as a by-
product of circumstances. Violence includes both clear and
immediate physical violence, and coercive circumstances
that have similarly threatening effects. Life includes both
biological existence and social existence, and basic material
and organizational conditions necessary to maintain them.
The more immediate and intense the life-threatening
141. Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 139, at 180.
142. Kibreab, Refugeehood, supra note 19, at 123.
143. See ARISTIDE ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND
THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989); see also Kibreab, supra
note 19.
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violence, the more clearly a person is a refugee rather than
a migrant. 144
Although Zolberg et al. do not directly refer to people displaced by
natural and man-made disasters and environmental degradation,
depending on the intensity of the pressure they are subjected to,
people fleeing from life-threatening violence or circumstances can be
considered as 'refugees.' Coercive circumstances even when not
perpetrated by a state or by a state's agents are said to be sufficient
grounds for 'refugee' status. The key criterion used by the authors is
the degree or intensity of need. If the circumstance regardless of its
cause is life-threatening, then the victim is a refugee and not a
migrant and should consequently be accorded full protection. 145
The fear of persecution stipulated in the 1951 Convention only
implies reasonable risk of harm to an individual's life, liberty and
safety. The questions that arise include: if coercive circumstances
not linked to civil or political status are considered adequate grounds
for protection, why should the risks involve life or death consequence
for the victims to quality for refugee status? Or does this suggest that
more stem criteria should be applied to those who flee for reasons
unrelated to violation of political and civil rights to be considered as
refugees? Would this not imply double standards? Non-political and
slow onset coercive circumstances are protracted, i.e. they are
cumulative. According to Zolberg et al's definition, those who flee
before the circumstances degenerate to life-threatening proportions
would not be accorded protection or refugee status. For example, one
of the indicators of land degradation is yield decline per unit of land
cultivated. In order to qualify for a refugee status, does it mean that
one should stay put until yields decline to zero levels and until the
food crops saved from previous seasons are exhausted? How is this
to be determined and by whom?
Zolberg et al. further state:
Situations in which the economic prerequisites for
sustaining life have suddenly been removed equally
constitute life-threatening violence, and such victims need
protection. This definition would include the poverty-
144. ZOLBERG ET AL., supra note 143, at 31.
145. Id. at 270.
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stricken masses of the developing world, the victims of
structural violence who are systematically pressed toward
starvation levels, and the victims of drought and famine,
with or without the compounded effect of warfare. 146
If one adopts this broad definition, people displaced by climate
change will be granted international protection and assistance.
Inasmuch as people flee due to interplay between inextricably
inter-woven multiple factors, such as droughts, persecutions, political
instabilities, wars, reduction of productive capabilities of life-
sustaining renewable resources caused by environmental degradation;
it is methodologically and empirically difficult to isolate and
determine the order of importance of each factor. Consequently, it is
difficult to distinguish between politically, environmentally and
economically motivated displacements. In view of the multiplicity
and complexity of the factors that prompt people to flee their places
of origin, the definition of the term 'refugee' suggested by Zolberg et
al. would represent an effective short-cut response to situations of
mass displacement.
Lazarus also argues in favour of the reconsideration of the
definition of the term refugee as defined by the 1951 U.N.
Convention He proposes a simple definition in which he states that,
"anyone forced to leave their habitat because of environmental
destruction"'' 47 should be entitled to refugee status regardless of
whether there is direct or indirect state action or complicity. Asylum
is a scarce resource and in the context of the current climate marked
by recession and compassion fatigue, it is unrealistic to expect the
institution of asylum would be able to cope with the demand that
would be placed on it by people who flee their countries of origin due
to any form of life-threatening circumstances unrelated to the
principle of 'well-founded fear of persecution' perpetrated by the
state or its agents. Inasmuch as the causes of displacement are varied
and complex, it is important that responses should also reflect these
complexities and variations. Lumping together all categories under
the refugee label may on the one hand, confuse rather than clarify the
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. David S. Lazarus, Environmental Refugees: New Strangers at the Door, 2
OUR PLANET 12, 14 (1990).
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situation and on the other, worsen the quality of protection accorded
to those persons who flee from persecution.
Notwithstanding the fact that accurate definitions are difficult in
migration studies-forced and unforced-they are indispensable
because the entitlements of the persons concerned, the obligations
and responsibilities of the sending and receiving states, as well as the
responsibilities and mandates of inter-governmental and non-
governmental organisations are determined by how the persons in
question are defined. Long-term solutions are also determined by the
kind of category a displaced person belongs. 148
X. CONCLUSION
Although the warming of the earth's climate system is not any
longer controversial, its social impacts, for example, on precipitation,
food insecurity, land use changes and overall agricultural production
are still ambiguous. 149 More equivocal are also the impact of climate
change on human migration. This should not be construed to imply
that climate change is an irrelevant factor in causing migration-be it
forced or voluntary. What is emphasised is the fact that climate
change operates in interaction with other multiple factors from which
it is impossible to isolate. The claim that climate change causes
population displacement is based on the wrong assumption that
displacement is partly mono-causal and climate change can be
isolated from other inextricably interwoven drivers of migration or
displacement.
The reason the available estimates of people displaced by climate
change are unreliable is due to the fact that migration is the result of
multiple causes and, therefore, it is difficult to isolate the role of the
environment from the other drivers of migration. Therefore as
argued in this paper, the available figures are based on educated
guesses and cannot therefore be the basis of evidence-based policy
which can help with pre-emption, mitigation or adaptation.
Nevertheless, given the likelihood of the potential effects of climate
148. Refugee Policy Group, Migration and the Environment, (Draft Briefing
Paper, Prepared for Conference on Migration and the Environment, Nyon,
Switzerland, January 19-22, 1992); see also SUHRKE, PRESSURE POINTS, supra note
6.
149. See, e.g., Boko, supra note 5.
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change, including on human migration and settlement in the future,
there should be no room for complacency, including on the question
of catering for the needs of those who are displaced by sudden onset
climate change and slow onset changes, such as global sea rise. 150
In spite of the uncertainties concerning the effect of climate change
on human displacement, given the fact that displacement is caused by
inseparably interlinked multiple drivers, including the environment
and in view of the mounting evidence of shifts in the climate (see Fig.
1) and consequent potential effects on future livelihoods, the
contribution of climate change to human migration may become
more pronounced in the future.
Therefore there is need for concerted international action not only
in terms of addressing the root causes of climate change and in
mitigating its detrimental consequences, but also in meeting the
protection and assistance needs of those who are affected. In the
presence of political will, negotiated scheme of burden-sharing,
international and regional solidarity, investment in poor and
vulnerable countries' disaster preparedness and effective early
warning systems, the protection and assistance needs of many of the
persons whose displacement is induced by environmental change can
be met within the framework of the existing international protection
regime manifested in the 1951 U.N. Convention, the 1967 Protocol,
the 1969 OAU Convention, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and the
1998 Guidelines on the Principles of Internal Displacement.
150. See John Connell, Losing Ground? Tuvalu, the Greenhouse Effect and the
Garbage Can, 44 ASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT 89 (2003); see also Lester R. Brown,
Rising Sea Level Forcing Evacuation of Island Country, EARTH POLICY INSTITUTE,
Nov. 15, 2001, http://earth-policy.org/Updates/Update2.htm.
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